mercredi 13 décembre 2017

Haïti : Présupposés de corrélation positive entre migration et dynamique économique du pays


Haïti : Présupposés de corrélation positive entre migration et dynamique économique du pays

 

Par Jean Laforest Visene de Lyvia Tulce

 

Idéologues et communicateurs des Mass-Média ne cessent de décrire l’économie haïtienne comme celle qui, depuis plus des centaines d’années,  est caractérisée par une économie de de production et de transaction économique de niveau primaire, particulièrement agricole et artisanale, dont la dominance, en terme d’affection humaine, repose sur la classe paysanne. A côté de cette composante de production interne qui est la partie la plus essentielle pour toute économie qui veut assurer soit un équilibre ou une progression en termes d’importance, il y a tant bien que mal un niveau d’activité tertiaire constituant de service et d’intermédiation. Cependant, malgré ce niveau d’affectation rurale, à la vraie substance économique, c’est-à-dire à la production de ces biens économiques, il est souvent dénoncé le niveau d’exploitation abusive dont sont subis les ruraux de la part d’une  classe dominante avec la complicité des appareils de l’Etat.

 

  1. D’une économie de subsistance à une diaspora de rente financière

Comme l’a fait remarquer une étude sur le développement rural en Haïti, la charte fondamentale de la république, en son article premier, établit clairement qu’ « Haïti est une république coopératiste »[1], garantissant, ainsi, les droits inaliénables de développement de la personne et des collectivités. Pourtant, il reste un fait que beaucoup de ruraux du pays n’ont pas d’accès à l’eau potable, aux soins de santé, au pain de l’instruction, à un logement décent et même à l’alimentation. Les rares efforts qui ont été déployés dans beaucoup de régions pour améliorer la condition d’existence des ruraux, au lieu d’améliorer les conditions des populations – cibles, ont plutôt entraînés le milieu rural dans un cercle vicieux du sous-développement[2].

 

La baisse de la production agricole, associée à d’autres, a des conséquences néfastes sur le reste de la charpente économique du pays. La balance commerciale s’est soldée par  un déficit de l’ordre de quelques centaines de millions de dollars[3]. Au cours de la deuxième moitié de la décennie des années 80 un déficit d’environ 165 millions de dollars a été enregistré, relate l’étude ci-dessus mentionnée.

 

            Des effets d’entraînement négatifs sont issus de la baisse de la production agricole du pays. Alors que le volume total des biens exportés a diminué considérablement, nos importations ont augmenté d’une façon alarmante. Il est important de faire constater la plus grande partie cette importation consistait en produits alimentaires. Et cette constations demeure la même aujourd’hui en terme de posture d’interaction économique du pays avec l’extérieur.

 

Cette situation n’a fait, au fil du temps, que contribuer au dépérissement de la paysannerie haïtienne, la décapitalisation des paysans eux-mêmes et empirer les conditions de vie des ruraux.  Cette misérable condition d’existence, associée à des facteurs sécuritaires, des Droits de l’Homme et de la Personne Humaine (DHPH), de la liberté d’association et d’expression politique et autres à provoquer une exode massives des ruraux vers des centres urbains à l’intérieur du pays, dans les Antilles, l’Amérique du Nord, certains pays européens et plus récemment des exodes massives vers des pays de l’Amérique latines comme le Chili, le Brésil, le Venezuela et autres.

 

Il faut faire remarquer que l’effet d’entraînement d’intensification des courants migratoires de déplacement massif des paysans a d’abord un impact négatif sur les milieux urbain en particulier la république de Port-au-Prince. Car, ce flux migratoire engendre des conséquences néfastes telles la détérioration des conditions de vie en milieu urbain, plus particulièrement les conditions d’assainissement, l’aggravation du problème de chômage urbain, de la crise du logement, entre autres la prolifération des bidonvilles, la détrition du semblant de climat de sécurité dans les villes.

 

En dépit du fait que ce vaste mouvement de mouvement de population a abouti à une importante diaspora haïtienne, laissant au pays leurs dépendants et autres proches parents est une expression de désespoir n’est-il pas possible de voir naitre de cette situation indésirable un impactage positif sur la vie économique du pays ? Car, les liens familiaux et de responsabilités naturelles des migrants vis-à-vis de leur dépendant restés en Haïti les poussent conserver leur attachement aux pays et à entretenir une intense transaction économique avec leur pays d’origine. De ces attachements s’entretient une dynamique d’échange et de solidarité, une participation de chacun à l’ensemble des activités économiques de la société haïtienne.

 

La migration peut être un facteur d’influence de la donne et de l’équilibre économique.  A titre d’exemple l’arrivée massive d’immigrants haïtiens au Chili l'an dernier, soit approximativement 300 par jour vers 2013, a permis le transfert de 36 millions de dollars américains vers Haïti en 2015. Avec ce migration intensive au Chili se chiffre autour des 490 000 Haiti est passé de la 11ème place à la 5ème place des pays bénéficiait des transferts du Chili   soit 5,9% du montant total devant des pays comme la République dominicaine (4,9%), les États-Unis (4, 5%) et l'Équateur (4,2%)[4]. On a bien noté qu’ici le flux humains peut avoir une incidence positive sur le flux financiers.

 

Ces transactions économiques, particulièrement, de type Transaction Monétaire (TM) ou Transfert de Fond (TF) ne devraient qu’avoir des incidences, positives que négatives, sur des aspects de l’économie du pays. D’autant plus que selon des sources diverses, le montant des TM ou TF vers Haïti s’élève à plusieurs centaines de millions de dollars américain. Même si cette masse de transaction n’aurait pas d’effet significative sur l’économie globale, mais il existe une possibilité d’incidence sur les conditions de vie des bénéficiaires restés au pays. Car il a été observé  que « les montants transférés de plus de 400 dollars sont parfois utilisés de deux manières : une part importante peut être employée à la construction graduelle à long terme d’une maison, la partie qui reste étant dévolue à la consommation de la famille de l’immigré[5] ».

 
2.  Présupposés théoriques

Notre présupposé de corrélation positive se base sur trois familles de théorie : sociologique, sciences du développement et économique. La première est celle de l’écart culturel. La deuxième est celle du pole e croissance et de développement polarisé et la troisième est de capital et épargne et investissement.

 
a) Théorie de l’écart culturel

Le sociologue William F. Ogburn a développé la théorie de l’écart culturel (1922) D’après cette théorie les changements se produisent généralement, d’abord dans les conditions matérielles de vie des sociétés, c’est-à-dire, milieu physique, ressources naturelles, conditions de travail, techniques de production... etc. Ensuite la culture matérielle doit s’adapter à ces changements. D’après Ogburn, cette adaptation se fait forcement avec un retard plus ou moins long. C’est ce retard que l’auteur appelle écart culturel.

 

            Il faut souligner que Tacolt Parsons  (1966) ne partage pas l’idée de la primauté du matériel dans l’évolution sociale. Cependant soulignons que la perspective d’Ogburn est à court terme et celle de Parsons est à long terme. Mais nous retenons l’explication causale du changement.  Il ressort que le changement est conditionné par la combinaison d’un ensemble d'éléments. Dans cette perspective, nous déterminons la responsabilité de la condition « technique spirituelle » ou de la condition matérielle ou de la combinaison des deux dans la un effet des transferts de fond sur l’inflation économique en Haïti. Donc il doit exister une étroite une corrélation positive entre ces transferts de fond et une progression significative culturelle de tout effet positif des TFM sur l’inflation économique.

 
b) Les pôles de croissance et de développement polarisé

            Selon François Perroux[6] dans son appréhension de la théorie générale u développement la croissance n'apparaît pas partout en même temps. Elle se manifeste en des points ou pôles de croissances avec des intensités variables pour l'économie. Il explique que le pôle de croissance est une unité motrice dans un milieu déterminé ou mieux encore comme un ensemble d'unité qui exerce des effets d'entraînement sur d'autres ensembles définis dans l'espace économique et géographique.

 

            En raison du principe d’impulsion, de propulsion et de contagion positive que suppose cette théorie nous plaçons nous les transferts de capitaux dans un contexte de la dynamique globale de l’économie haïtienne pour supposer que les transferts de fond des migrants peuvent avoir une incidence positive sur des paramètres de la dynamique économique et traduit dans des observations sur des réalités observables telles que la posture économique des bénéficiaires de ces fonds en terme d’effet sur leur mode d’interaction dans la réalité économique et aussi sur des phénomènes économiques plus globale comme l’inflation. Notre théorie ne postule que les transactions des migrants, dans la logique de ce qu’on appelle Dynamic Propulsive Firm (DPF), peut être considérée comme empreinte de Marked Local Multiplier Effect (MLME). C’est une démarche non-classique et spécifique à la dimension des caractéristiques typologiques des pays de même nature qu’Haïti.

 
c) La théorie de la corrélation entre capital et épargne et investissement

Les théories du capital et de l’épargne[7] associent le développement à la croissance économique. Le développement économique n’est, dans cette conception, qu’un résultat des investissements qui, à son tour aurait été déterminé par l’accès au capital. La conclusion logique serait que l’épargne conditionne l’investissement, l’investissement la croissance, la croissance le développement. Ce qui fait que le sous-développement serait un cercle vicieux où il serait difficile pour les pays répondant à la dimension de ce concept de s’y défaire. Conséquemment, la diminution de l’inflation au niveau d’une économie est tributaire de l’équation : Capital (C), Epargne (E) et Investissement (I) et Consommation (C0). D’où notre formule d’impactage de l’inflation économique (IIE) à travers la manipulation de ces trois variables et paramètres économiques :

% IE =  % C+ I +E

           ___________

                               % C0

 

Précisons un peu plus clairement l’essence de cette théorie. Bien avant, disons qu’elles reposent sur l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’accès au capital de placement créé par l’épargne détermine l’ampleur de la croissance économique. Dans le cadre de notre travail on pourrait dire que le manque ou la fluidité de capitaux pour investir pourrait la raison de l’inflation économique, Par contre des sources singulières comme les transferts de fond peuvent constituer une source de capitaux à investir et que l’effet qui en résultera dépendra de la rationalité d’agir-économiques des bénéficiaires de ces transferts et aussi de sa représentation en terme de valeur. Car, le manque de capital ne peut pas expliquer à lui seul ce résultat. Car on peut avoir le capital pour investir mais si on n’a pas la connaissance et la formation pour l’investir à bon escient, il ne servirait à rien d’autre qu’au gaspillage du capital[8].

 

Toutefois, les théories du capital, de l’épargne et de l’investissement sont utiles puisqu’elles permettraient de comprendre combien l’absence de structures ou de mécanismes d’octroi de ressources production entraverait la productivité au niveau économique de tout environnement. Elles nous permettent de comprendre aussi que les ressources de production ne s’expriment pas seulement en des termes monétaires mais aussi en des termes intrinsèque aux caractéristiques socio-culturelles et de tout autres aléas dont elle est tributaire.

 
3. Facteurs exogènes concomitants

Il est rationnel de penser que les transferts de fond des migrant ont une incidence sur des aspects de la configuration de l’économie globale du pays.  Mais cependant, l’indice de cette influence n’est appréciable qu’en référence à des facteurs exogène qui lui dont complètement indépendante. Car s’il existe des transferts de l’extérieur vers l’intérieur, il existe aussi bien des transferts de l’intérieur vers l’extérieur. L’équilibre ne s’obtiendra qu’en agissant sur  facteurs concomitants telles que : L’importation, les exportations, les transferts par obligation et/ou responsabilités sociales, le travail - salaires et statut des immigrés, les facteurs multipolaire du champ migratoire : intégration et/ou de réintégration

 

4. Postulats

 

L’influence des Transferts des Migrants Haïtien ne pourra que si dans un cadre macro des dispositifs de contrôle soient mis en place. Dans un processus de compréhension de l’idée effective des TFM il est recommandé de porter un regard sur :

  • Mobilité résidentielle des bénéficiaires restants en Haïti ;
  • Intégration-réintégration des immigrés eux-mêmes ;
  • Changement au niveau de reconfiguration économique et spatiale de territoires ; ;
  • Comportement des migrants en la matière et les types d’investissement dans les processus socio-spatiaux d’intégration/ réintégration ;
  • Multi-polarisation des champs migratoires et de ses réseaux de transferts ;
  • Facteurs qui pèsent aussi sur la décision du migrant pour procéder à un transfert d’argent ;
  • Intension des transferts vers Haïti : Financement de l’émigration/ré-migration où l’essentiel de la paie mensuelle

 

Il est par ailleurs souligné que les transferts sont influencés par la localisation spatiale urbaine/rurale et les quartiers de résidence, l’âge, le genre, le statut matrimonial, le statut d’occupation du logement, la catégorie socioprofessionnelle, le travail, le salaire et le statut juridique de l’immigré. Les choix d’installation et/ou de retour jouent sur les transferts d’argent, l’épargne et les types d’investissement[9] Les immigrés qui se font une obligation d’envoyer de l’argent mensuellement ou trimestriellement entretiennent des relations sociales fortes et très proches avec les membres de leur famille restée en Haïti. En revanche, ceux qui transfèrent de l’argent sur une base annuelle s’inscrivent de préférence dans une relation familiale faible ou élargie avec Haïti, sauf si c’est la persistance du chômage qui les contraint à ne faire qu’un seul transfert par an.

 

 
5. Démarche de vérification

Pour la réalisation de ce travail, comme instruments d'orientation méthodologique, nous utilisons les approches en recherche documentaire, et en recherche empirique. La démarche critique et historique est aussi empruntée. Par ailleurs, nous nous servons de la méthode comparative pour parvenir à l’analyse et à l’interprétation des données collectées. Cette démarche est particulièrement appliquée au niveau de l’analyse et de l’interprétation. Entre temps, disons que la recherche documentaire nous a permis de nous référer à des expériences de quelques pays pour voir si u cour de leur histoire le type de corrélation entre les transferts de fonds des migrants ave la dynamique économique interne en particulier son impact sur le phénomène de l’inflation.

 
a) Contenu de la démarche

Nous exploitons des encyclopédies, des ouvrages, des thèses, des journaux et périodiques, et des statistiques brutes. Nous faisons également des entrevues dirigées avec des bénéficiaires des transferts de la part de migrants haïtiens. D’autre part, l'approche critique et historique nous a permis d’observer, à travers le temps, l’impact des transferts sur les conditions d’existence de ces bénéficiaires afin de pouvoir établir les incidences de ces actions sur le phénomène de l’inflation à l’échelle de l’économie globale.

 

La démarche empirique, c’est-à-dire l’enquête sur le terrain, quant à elle, nous donne l’occasion de confronter les résultats des séances discursives avec les bénéficiaires  avec la réalité effective et actuelle de ces derniers. Cet exercice nous permet de base à l’énonciation des recommandations.

 
b) Précisions sur les enquêtes documentaire et empirique

Concernant l’enquête documentaire, nous faisons dans un premier temps l’inventaire des documents qui traitent directement ou indirectement du des transferts des migrants haïtien vers Haïti. Dans un deuxième temps, nous exploitons les documents plus importants pour notre travail c’est-à-dire nous permettant d’apprécier nos hypothèses de recherche. Il faut préciser que dans cette même optique nous exploitons des données factuelles de sources diversifiées en particulier celles de l’Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d’Informatique (IHSI).

 

En ce qui concerne les données empiriques, elles sont le résultat d’enquête sur les conditions de vie des bénéficiaires des transferts de fond de la part des migrants haïtiens. Pour collecter ces informations, nous utilisons deux instruments de recherche : Une grille d’entretien et un guide d’observation. Le contenu de ces deux instruments se fond sur les indicateurs des variables que nous identifions au travers de nos hypothèses de recherche. De surcroit, il faut indiquer que nous réalisons des entretiens libres avec des spécialistes / experts, des institutions et des travailleurs du secteur de migrations / transfert.

 

Les données empiriques de l’étude que nous exploitons sont basées sur un plan d’échantillonnage intentionnel c’est-à-dire un échantillonnage non probabiliste[10] dans lequel les unités sont  choisies  suivant qu’elles répondent  à un profil de l’informateur que nous définissons.  A partir de cette échantillon des données quantitative (par questionnaires) et qualitative (par des entretiens semi-directifs) sont issues. La représentativité de l’échantillon tient compte de la question de tendances observées : Réseau de migrants haïtiens et réseau des bénéficiaires.

 

Dans cette étude le profil défini comprend deux critères :

  • Etre résident dans la zone de délimitation de notre enquête ;
  • Ayant un proche parent migrant résident à l’extérieure et bénéficiant d’un appui monétaire de la part de ce dernier.
  • Y habiter depuis  au moins cinq ans.
     
    Inversement, des critères similaires sont définis pour l’échantillon des migrants informateurs.
     
    Nous avons dit que pour parvenir à l’analyse et à l’interprétation des résultats de la recherche nous utilisons la méthode comparative. Bien avant d’expliquer pourquoi nous faisons ce choix il de la probité scientifique d’expliquer les limites de cette démarche.
     
c) Avantage et limite de la démarche de l’approche comparative

Il est vrai que Madeleine Grawitz précise que la méthode comparative s’appuie sur des comparaisons pour mesurer l’efficacité d’une technique par rapport à une autre. Elle peut être utilisée dans des études vastes et des études de secteurs particuliers, des études à caractère qualitatives et / ou quantitatives et qu’elle est applicable à toutes les phases d’une recherche : Observation, description, classification et explication. Cependant, l’analyse qui en découle peut se révéler limiter puisque le lien de causalité établi, le plus souvent, ne tient compte que des facteurs endogènes ou exogènes dit M. Grawitz. Quel est l’avantage de la méthode comparative dans le cadre de notre travail ?

 

Précisons que la méthode comparative est pour les organicistes la meilleure pour étudier des aspects de la vie en société incluant les aspects  d’évolution socio-économique. Car, la méthode expérimentale, proprement-dite, nécessite un long temps d’exposition de l’objet à la loupe du chercheur et la triangulation de plusieurs aspects sous-jacents de la dynamique de l’existence de l’objet.

 

Par ailleurs, la méthode expérimentale exige l’introduction d’éléments nouveaux dans le système pour observer le comportement de ce dernier. A ce moment, on risquerait de produire des effets qui en quelques sortes peuvent le résultat de l’influence du chercheur. Or nous ne disposons ni de ces moyens pour tout observer du bénéficiaire en raison de son caractère multidimensionnel, relationnelle et intimes de sa vie, ni le temps et ne voulons pas provoquer volontairement des résultats par notre seul fait de notre interaction. A notre avis c’est un bais pour la recherche Ne reste donc, à notre service que la méthode comparative une forme d’expérimentation indirecte[11] pour parvenir à l’explication.

 

La méthode comparative nous permet de faire l’analyse des similitudes et des dissemblances. Elle nous donne aussi la possibilité d’établir la relation de causalité entre les variables. Se rapportant toujours à une réalité préexistante, la méthode comparative exige pourtant un système de références. C’est sur cette notion de système de référence que repose l’application de la démarche comparative que nous utilisons dans notre travail qui permet de faire le lien entre les conditions socio-économiques d’existence des bénéficiaires afin de comprendre l’incidence de ces transferts des migrants sur la vie économiques des bénéficiaire et son impactage sur le phénomène de l’inflation dans l’économie globale.

 
6. Conclusion

Nous sommes convaincus que seul un cadre historico-social et comparatif peut permettre d’étudier les réalités sociales, faits et phénomènes, et les évolutions atypiques des secteurs d’activités humaines. Nous osons de croire à cette aventure car comme l’a dit un ancien ambassadeur indien affectée en France, reprise par Guy Vavon : «  Plus important que la science. D’ailleurs, la pensée tout comme l’idéologie est préexiste à la science et cette dernière n’existerait pas si cette prémices n’y était pas. Le fait de penser à porter notre regard sur la dynamique des structures et des systèmes qui entourent le phénomène de migration est fondamentale pour savoir comment des macrodécisions s’imposent afin que des effets désirés soient atteints.

 

JLV de Lyvia Tulce



[1] Voir la constitution du 29 mars 1987.
[2] Jean Laforest Visene, Condition rurale en Haïti : Questionnement et stratégie de changement, Département des Sciences du Développement – Faculté d’Ethnologie - Université d’Etat d’Haïti, Port-au-Prince, Haïti, 2002 page 3.
[3] Ibid., p. 8.
[4] Les Haïtiens au Chili ont transféré 36 millions de dollars en 2016, in Le Nouvelliste, 3 Juillet 2017, http://lenouvelliste.com/article/172849/les-haitiens-au-chili-ont-transfere-36-millions-de-dollars-en-2016
[5] Transferts d’argent des migrants haïtiano-guyanais dans la multipolarité de l’espace Américain Dans Migrations Société 2012/5 (N° 143), https://www.cairn.info/publications-de-Z%C3%A9phirin-Romanovski--662474.htm, page 41.
[6] François Perroux, pôles de croissance et de développement polarisé,  p. 15.
[7] Engellau Patrick, Développement et sous-développement : Les théories du Sous-développement, Deuxième partie, mars 1976, p. 9 - 11.
[8] Jean Laforest Visene, 2002, OP. Cit. page 62 et 63.
[9] Romanovski Zéphirin.
[10] GILLES, Alain, Éléments de méthodologie et d’analyse statistique pour les sciences sociales, Québec, Les Éditions McGraw, 1994, page, 223 et 450.
[11] Madeleine Grawitz, Méthodes des sciences sociales, Éditions Dalloz (10e Édition),  Paris, 1996 p. 380.

vendredi 12 mai 2017

TO SEEKING PHILOSOPHY AND IDEAL SCHEMES of the DDR SECOND GENRATION / COMMUNITY VIOLENCE REDUCTION PROGRAMME


 

To SEEKING PHILOSOPHY AND IDEAL SCHEMES of the DDR SECOND GENRATION / Community Violence Reduction Programme

 

Par Jean Laforest Visene de Lyvia Tulce

 

What is the mind of DDR second generation that is being implemented in the United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)? How we can describe an ideal scheme of this DDR process, reaching the inclusion of keys communities’ actors in the establishment of communities’ peaceful cohabitation, community stabilization and its maintenance? What is the expectation for DDR Second generation achievement as DPKO investment and in the view of it DDR policy, whatever specific name of this programme? And what is the link and the difference between a traditional DDR programme and a DDR second generation, like Community violence Reduction Programme? Those are some questions outlined by paper write in the aim to contribute to the CVR theories and practices to present a new approach to one of the more controversial aspects of DDR second generation / CVR aspects : . The purpose of such a program and the proof of its success.

 

        I.            To avoid misunderstanding
 
DDR second generation has formally started and experienced in Haiti in 2007[1], Central African Central African Republic (2014)[2] and with variant models in South Soudan[3], Ivory Coast and Somalia. The idea of DDR second generation came after finding that the results of traditional DDR efforts were not far from even to the expectation. DDR second generation would like to be an innovative DDR strategy to get better results, effective assistance in achieving peace, security and stabilization in fragile country.
 
The most popular variant of the second generation of DDR is known as Community Violence Reduction (CVR). Moreover, it is actually implemented in more than four UN peacekeeping missions: in Haiti with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); In RCA with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MINUSCA); in RDC with United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO; in Mali with United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
 
It true DDR “were often carried-out a disjointed and un-integrated way due to poor coordination, planning and support, and sometimes competition between and among peacekeeping operations, agencies, funds and programmes”[4].  But, it’s true also, despite the usable policy, guidance and tools provided by the IDDRS[5], the traditional DDR, in its approach, is not adapted to all countries contexts and cannot open the way for a suitable stabilization and open the business for real development program. In this mind, second Generation DDR programmes are a response to the challenging contexts in which the UN is working alongside national governments, civil society, and international partners to maintain the peace process and contribute to stabilization[6].
 
From the experiences of the above mentioned countries, it’s outlined that the a second generation of DDR, like Community Violence Reduction, can delivered its goals if resources are truly synergized and the response take into account the structure and mechanisms of community violence, and also if the response is monitored, making follow-up and defined an appropriate exit strategy.
 
This forward looking philosophy and strategy of SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  highlight, for users and SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  clients, the need to have a good relationship between actors and also the requirement to harmonize SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  approach with the overall stabilization mission strategy, specifically it’s integration into the strategy of the mission substantives sections and units.
 
As description of an ideal-type of DDR SECOND GENERATION programme, it not here the intention to propose a model for a particular country. Because the implementation context of a SECOND GENERATION OF DDR program may vary from one country to another. Moreover, our understanding is that: the DDR second generation came in support of the traditional DDR. It’s implemented later launching the national DDR programme in the aim reach out recalcitrant.
 
As CVR is the most popular of DDR second generation, this paper will describe ideal scheme of the second generation of DDR based on the understanding of the concept of CVR. What that mean Community Violence Reduction?
 
      II.            Initial mind of The Community Viollence Reduction Concept
 
What was the initial spirit of the CVR? To understand it, let us take a look at the course of the concept, its mutation and its strategic issues within the framework of the DDR program in Haiti.
 
The concept of CVR has been reached out in Haiti comfortably in 2007. Its issued from a strategic plan defined by the joint DDR-PNUD/MINUSTAH section in the aim  to accompanied the reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities through stopgaps projects that will achieved a “Centre de Prevention de la Violence et de Development (CPVD)” that should be the emanation of satellites centers named “Centre de Developement Communautaire (CDC)’ (Community Development Center). The figure below illustrate the functionalities of the Principal center and its satellites centers:
 
Figure I : Dynamic of CPVD and CDC strategy
 
What was in the ground of this window strategic centers? The CVPD and its satellite centers were designed from the strategic perspective of the so-called "Revelation and Problem Analysis Map" (RPAM). This perspective addresses the problem of violence under five chapters: The problem as factor t pathology causing dysfunction of community safety and social normality; The facts and findings of its negative influence on the social environment; The causes that engender it, its current and future consequences; And finally the issuance of recommendations and action to mitigate or at least reduce the degree of nuisance of the problem for stabilization actions which constitute an important first step for effective development actions of the target communities.
 
It is understandable that the philosophy of CPVD and the CDC actions is a structuring, constructive and dialectical approach. It was intended to facilitate collegiate choices (communities and partners) in mitigating community violence. Community structuring was therefore seen as the main lever for mitigating community violence in this CPVD / CDC strategy.
 
On the one hand, the demobilized soldiers and its associates militias grouping together in the "Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH)" grafted on a political movement denominated "Grenn Nan Bouda - GNB" opposing to the power in place headed by Jean Bertrand Aristide, which movement has been embedded by the Haitian commercial group’s and elements from the middle class. In the other hand, the partisans of President Aristide, in particular from the populous slums cities, which supporters are known as "Rat pa kaka". This group is the emanation of the Vigilance Brigarde Movement[7], which became an armed self-defense group, in response, first, to the phenomenon of zenglendo during the transitional period from 1987 to 1990, then after, the military persecution during the period of the  coup-d’état against the same Jean Bertrand Aristide 1991. As the Rat Pa Kaka was not a really structured and hierarchized movement at the capitulation of the former President Jean Bertrand Aristide, in 2004, this groups has embedded by criminal actors transforming the groups in gang, operating in kidnapping, theft and burglary, political crime, attack against UN forces and other. But they still has populous slums cities as area of refuge and protection.
 
As resume of the conflict context we highlight the presence of two species cases groups before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti: (i) A hybrid group composed of men of weapons trades and of supporters well trained in camps and having a hierarchized commander; (ii) groups composed of disparate cells without any military discipline, hidden in the communities that serve as protection shield and without commandment and hierarchies. The real context was that: (i) it was not a political conflict with clear claim from parties; (ii) Peace mediation and/or negotiation between parties was not possible because of the nature of the groups, the dynamic of the violence and the lack of leadership among the groups; (iii) Called the groups to surrounded and to disarmament, on the basis of the classic DDR and the practices would be a sermon in the desert.
 
Faced with these separate characteristics of the different groups involved in the conflict, challenging the DDR classics, and the volatile political context, the Haitian government authorities and the United Nations peacekeeping mission confronted a big dilemma: How to address the disarmament of non-formal groups, rejecting a traditional DDR process, and even taking refuge into populous communities that protects them? The solution proposed was the implementation in these communities, firstly, Stop-gap projects, which would create confidence within the UN and both of the communities and of the armed groups themselves refusing to join the program; Little by little, decrease the influence of groups on the community will, in order to find credible community leaders to negotiate the disarmament of the groups. Reinforcing the community capacities to accompany the process, not only disengagement of gang members’, but also support the reinsertion and reintegration process.
 
For first stage of the disarmament program, the government has appointed two keys interlocutor: (i) Bureau de Gestion des Militaires Demobilsés (BGMD) (ii) the Commission Nationale de Desarmement (CND), thal will became Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CNDDR). The first one to address the formal group and the last one to take over the strategy for the informal groups.
 
For many reason, that are not necessary to explain here, the CPVD/CDC strategy has not implemented by the joint-section DDR-MINUSTAH PNUD.  In 2006 the section was divided, on the one hand UNDP developed its program called “Programme de Securité Communautaire” and on the other hand the MINUSTAH with a DDR program that did not say its name. It was then that in 2007 the "Community Violence Reduction Program" was baptized in the spirit of the CPVD / CDC strategy.
 
    III.            Mains goals of Traditional DDR and Second generation DDR
 
        i.            Traditional DDR and Second generation of DDR dynamic
It accepted that the DDR 1st generation and DDR 2nd generation peruse the same objective:  Contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. And then, the Core DDR activities and projects of the both pursue the same final goal:  Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into civilian life and to prevent the resurgence of violence into affected communities.
 
It’s is also evident that the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  strategy is an alternative approaches to addressing DDR and unregulated weapons circulation in the violent environment and avoids the recovered of community structure by artisans of violence, as was the suitcase in Haiti.
 
Figure 2: Traditional DDR and DDR second generation dynamic
 
      ii.            What can differed in the both kind of DDR
It’s important to highlight that:
§  SECOND GENERATION OF DDR activities and its projects are a pretext to address and mitigate violence through communities’ affected, specifically violence generated by armed groups and uncontrolled circulation of weapons and ammunitions into these communities. SECOND GENERATION OF DDR strategy use community-based resources that are proven to address the problems of community violence. It contemplates internal strengths and opportunities for conflict resolution and / or prevention and reinforces factors that make the community resilient to the threats of internal and external violence.
 
§  The strategy of SECOND GENERATION OF DDR as Second generation of DDR is an adaption approach and one of tools of the UN to identify ways of ‘disengaging’ combatants in complex crisis, build peace, security and development communities.
 
As outlined by the figure 1, above, the difference between the both programmes is Guidance and implementation process. The first gone in one way, focused on the ex-combatants needs, while the second focused on the communities needs to fight against violence, weakness in the control and management of weapons and ammunitions in the community, and support the effective reintegration of the ex-combatants into the civilian life.
 
Another thing that could be a significant difference between Traditional DDR and second generation of DRR is that the first one is specifically linkage with the formal peacekeeping mission, while the second has interventions in the boundaries of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement. It seems also emphasis with the processing of stabilization, peace consolidation and long-term recovery and development. In this regard DDR second generation program like Community Violence Reduction Programme could a good tool for a peacekeeping mission to play its role of peacemaking efforts and to involve in early peace-building activities[8].
 
    iii.            Rational expectation of DDR Second generation whatever its name
A real DDR programme whatever its kind of need to disarming, demobilizing, reinserting people and hand-over them for a long-term reintegration.  In this regards DDR second generation need to contribute to attempts, at least, to one of the three pillars of the DDR business, clearly defined by the UN-DDR policy. Such program could have as prioritize actions as:
§  Firstly, accompanying to demobilized combatants waiting their reinsertion / reintegration package: Occupied them during this phase and peruse them to keep-out of the community violence dynamic and prevent they been recycled into armed groups;
§  Pursue members of armed groups which not has joined the National DDR programme to disarm :  Create confident to the program and define a community way to engage them to a community DDR process in close relationship with host country authorities;
§  Prevent the recruitment of young-at-risk by armed groups: Help them to be able to satisfy their basics need by providing them income generating activities, skill-training and/or job placement;
§  Reinforcing/Build the capacities of communities-leaders and communities base structure and organization to give best accompanying to the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants and also able the prevent violence into their respective communities;
§  Address specifics aspects of the communities’ violence as child soldiers, women serving as support to armed groups: joint action with relevant institution and organization who have legitimacy and technical expertise.
 
However the programme could have any kind of stopgap projects as pretext to find out these relevant DDR objectives. It could be infrastructure rehabilitation, watershed management, socio-economic /income generating, civic and socialization, community conflict management, capacity building, etc. But the focus should need to be disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion / reintegration of people involving or has involved in community violence related to weapons and ammunitions.
 
It is true that the objectives of disarmament demobilization and reintegration / reintegration are underlying the second-generation DDR strategy. However, it is necessary to avoid giving the impression that the United Nations deals more with those who involve in violence, give greater importance to those who hold weapons or who are and/or were the main instigators of the conflict, put them in stark contrast to the rest of society. In any case, it is the perception that has been denoted at the level of several countries. Rightly or wrongly, it means that less attention would paid to the rest of society, neglecting the conversations within society on the root causes of the conflict. It is these perceptions that a second generation DDR squanders favoring the emergence of a collective will to solve the problem and help build synergy to build peace. It’s needed to push the elite and the rest of society to share the common DDR goal. If not, the United Nations may contribute to the perpetuation of the conflict cycle. Above all, if the population suffers because of the situation of armed violence that would have been forged by the targets beneficiaries of the DDR programme. In such a context, the credibility of the institution would be diminished.
 
   IV.            Vision/ Anchoring
 
The overall vision of a second-generation DDR program should blended by three main vision :
§  The hosted state's understanding vision, often drafted in it National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Strategy;
§  The mandate defined in the UN-Security Council Resolution related to the peacekeeping mission;
§  The DPKO policy and protocol on DDR practices;
 
The perception of specific communities and its cultural dynamics, need to be highly considered in this perspective. Certainly in terms of understanding of the functionalities, relationship of armed groups with communities and the circulation of arms, and finally the mandate given by the UN Security Council on DDR.
 
In fact, the vision of the United Nations is minor, emphasized on the two first one. The United Nations Peacekeeping mission offered it good services and technical expertise though its peacekeeping structures to resolve the problem. So, as with traditional DDR, a second-generation DDR program is not the UN program. It is the program of the host state and its target communities. The United Nations would only provide expertise and financial support for the design and implementation of such a programme.
 
The vision of a SCOND GENERATION OF DDR Programme as support to the host country reverenced strongly to the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), the National Development Program (NDP), particularly National DDR Programme (NDDP) and to others relevant UN and states guidance documents[9].
 
However, it must be recognized that, in many cases, difficult working conditions do not make it possible to arrive at a genuine understanding of the problem and to harmonize everything according to such a vision. Despite this challenge, it is necessary to have the task of having an alleged entry strategy of scholarly formalities which could gradually take its technical and structuring aspects. Practitioners should avoid that the ingredients of the entry strategy do not set standards of intervention throughout the duration of the programme.
 
     V.            Problem statement
 
What is the problem that a DDR second generation will address? [That will depend to the problem statement in the mission strategic plan and/or specifically in the mission mandate.
 
i.                    Fundamental problems
§  Violence crime remain the most important social problem affecting the quality of  life in communities around the world;
§  Violence and organized violence affects individuals, families, the community and human society in general;
§  Violence among and within communities is variable and multidimensional;
§  Organized crime and community violence is a handicap for local, national and international development.
 
ii.                  Specific problem
§  Community violence in general, Specifically armed violence, whether by armed gangs, militias or paramilitary groups is a threat to national and international peace and security;
§  Non-legitimate violence, whatever its form and purpose, or its instigator, is a serious violation of human rights, dignity and the well-being of humanity.
 
iii.                Assumption
The stabilization of a social environment targeted by a DDR Second generation program requires specific actions on natural vectors and structural factors of community violence.
 
   VI.            Main targets[10]
 
The main target do second-generation DDR need to be need to be identified accordingly with the parameters of the communities’ violence. The program targets should be closely linked to the DDR mission assumptions. Whether they are operational, induced, observed or inferred, it makes it possible to identify not only the vectors of violence but also the variables that are in fact the levers of community violence. In principle, the hypothesis on community violence is fruitful in the sense that it already has at least adequate answers to the problem at least for its partial resolution. Moreover, this is the very reason for the ex-ante evaluation of the program, which should have the posture of a positive science with qualities of recommendations imprinted with neutrality and axiological distance.
 
Being also in line with the objective of protecting civilians, human rights and the Rules of Law, a second-generation DDR program must be seen as a program, is in line with a social justice program, takes into account those who are left behind, and defenseless people, vulnerable to be recruited and / or support for armed groups and the spiral of community violence. Moreover, this type of program does not make the ex-combatant a star, rehabilitated prestigiously for having taken up arms and which benefits from all opportunities in DDR to the detriment of the community.
 
For a real impact on the community violence dynamic, we listed, below, but no limited, some  main targets beneficiaries in some Second Generation of DDR programme:
§  Youth-at-risk (boys and girls);
§  Ex-combatants in the process of reinsertion/reintegration and its former-associates ;
§  Armed groups unengaged in the DDR process;
§  Prisoners in the process of liberation and return to social and community life;
§  Victims of armed groups ;
§  Local state institutions;
§  Communities leaders;
§  Community based organizations (CBO’s).
 
While the first five beneficiaries receive support for socio-economic reintegration, the latter three receive support for capacity building to reduce and prevent community violence. However, the mission need to make a choice according to their funding.
 
 VII.            Key goals
 
        i.            General goal
The key goal of a DDR second generation programme is to create an enabling environment for the reduction of armed violence and insecurity, through the combination of efforts of community reconciliation, strengthening of State institutions, development of the Haitian National Police (HNP), strengthening of the judicial sector and socioeconomic recovery.
 
      ii.            Specifics goals:
Among the specifics goal could have, but not limited:
        i.            Outline a SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  strategy in conformity with international standards and conventions are drafted and endorsed at least at the level of affected communities in close implication of state representatives;
 
 ii.      Provide alternatives to violence as a means of subsistence for disadvantaged and / or at-risk youth, who are unoccupied, because their situation makes them vulnerable more easily coveted by the offers of community violence actors;
 
iii.      Strengthen the capacity of Security Sector institutions, especially Police Institution, and  communities to work together to  address security threats to social, economic and cultural;
 
iv.      Support the process of post-custodial reinsertion of detained common rights detainees who will return to the target areas of the program[11].
 
Final expectation
  i.      Loss of influence and power of armed and criminal groups on targeted communities;
ii.      Targeted communities are stabilized and then development can begin;
iii.      Development and / or improvement of community resilience factors to prevent community violence, respond to threats and / or resurgence of community violence.
 
VIII.            Particular Strategy
 
        i.            Focusing of the strategy
§  Reinsertion / Re-socialization and psychosocial support for Youth-at-risk  and victims of community violence;
§  Facilitating / supporting the reinsertion and/or reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian and community life;
§  Prevention and/or mitigation of community violence (Intra or inter, or specific violence);
§  Improving effectiveness of criminal Justice;
§  Support for the restoration of State authority and the establishment of Rule of Law.
 
      ii.            Key interventions
Among the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  interventions, if we consider the world peace mission, their configuration, the dynamic of the conflict targeted,  the structure and social organization where they operate, the strengths and weaknesses of communities to combat violence SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  program focused on :
§  Vocational training and job employment;
§  Socialization, psychosocial support and civic education;
§  Rehabilitation of community infrastructures;
§  Rapprochement Police and Community;
§  Mediation, conflict resolution and Social cohesion;
§  Social mobilization and outreach;
§  Legal assistance.
§  Supporting efforts to control the flow of small arms;
§  Support the development of a national community policing doctrine
But SECOND GENERATION OF DDR strategy fit its program closely community need to address community violence dynamic. In this thinking, this list is not limited to the intervention components that a SECOND GENERATION OF DDR program must contain.
 
    IX.            Intervention approach and principle
 
        i.            Approaches
DDR second generation program forcing to be presented as integrated, delivery-oriented approach with specific mechanism to develop a joint-collaborative framework.
 
§   Holistic and comprehensive (global and systematic rather than with individual parts);
§  Multi-dimensional (Autonomy of system with the existence of components independent variable);
§  Multi-sectorial (Multi-channel response with needed coordination and collaboration among various stakeholder);
§   Multidirectional (reaching output from several directions).
 
      ii.            Principles
Based on the UN value, the Principe of intervention need to be :
   i.        Good offices, advice and support to the state institution in the field of DDR Second generation and reintegration / reintegration of ex-combatants;
 ii.        Rationality, neutrality, impartiality, independence and objectivity of the program in relation to the interests of belligerents in internal conflicts;
iii.        Efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the intervention is the criterion for the choice of the financing of a project proposal of the program;
iv.        Equal treatment of partners and targeted beneficiaries;
  v.        Commitment in the program is voluntary and free;
vi.        Sharing responsibilities and synergizing resources, including endorsement of results: failure and success, is the best way to implement a DDR Second generation Program.
 
    iii.            Keys concerns
In reference to the above understanding of the objective of a DDR second generation, our inception is that below:
  i.       Does the proposed action meet a real need assessed under objective conditions and it is linked to a vector and/or factor of community violence?
ii.       How proposed action can support the reinsertion/reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian and community life and/or mitigate the recruitment of youth-at-risk, demobilized elements from militias and self-defense group by armed or criminal groups?
iii.       How is the proposed action effective in addressing the specific problem related to the community violence?
iv.       How it proposed action can contribute to serve as mediation, conflict resolution and Social cohesion into the target community;
v.       How will be measured the effect and impact of such action on the overall problem of community violence?
vi.       How is efficient the cost to be invested for such an action?
 
      X.            Keys actors[12]
 
                           i.            Need assessment, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
  i.             Host government and its series institutions such as the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (NCDDR), Ministries and Directorate having authority over the areas of intervention of the program, Regional institutions (as Delegation and / or prefecture, Mayor’s Office and other Local authorities), Defense and security forces (DSF) specifically the National Police institution, Justice sector etc.;
ii.             Targeted Communities and civil society: Community leaders including Religions leaders; Targeted beneficiaries, Community Based Organizations (CBO’s), Private sector; National and international Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s), Armed groups, …
iii.             University and Strategic Research Centers on Peacekeeping and Peace Building;
iv.             United Nations Stabilization Components, especially substantives sections and units into stabilization mission;
 v.             Relevant agencies from the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) UN affiliates organizations[13];
vi.             Donors.
 
                         ii.            Specific actors for the mind of intervention contents[14]
   i.      The population at large, through increased stability and prospects for economic activity accruing from a reduction in violence and stability.
 ii.       Government and its Security sector institutions, through increased institutional capacity and presence to respond to urgent needs in terms of policing, crime prevention and local visibility;
iii.       Community groups (associations, local NGOs, municipal forums…), through their participation in local community and recovery projects, with an emphasis on their empowerment and accountability within a community driven planning process;
iv.       High-risk groups, including women and children through the creation of educational supports and short employment opportunities in community development schemes.
 v.      Ex-Combatants who will really reintegrated in into their civilian life;
 
                       iii.            Accountability
As all UN programmes, SECOND GENERATION OF DDR projects and activities supported by UN or donors funds are subject to audit. It’s the obligation of the implementation team, external actors and the organization ensure that the accountability schemes are taken in consideration and the results are in a transparent manner.
 
It’s also important to specify SECOND GENERATION OF DDR programmes and its projects/activities are subject to internal and external evaluation. Its evaluation need to outline best practices and lessons learned for correctives actions and sharing experiences with other UN missions and actors.
 
    XI.            Evidence of the problem solving
 
As we mentioned above the DDR second generation / Community Violence reduction programme have two aspects: quantitative and qualitative. Dependent on the projects and activities implemented the impact can be visible by the following observations:
      i.         Decrease of violence statistic related to robbery, domestic violence, beneficiary communities;
    ii.         Visible improvement of the community environment;
  iii.         Increased intensity of economic activities in the community;
  iv.         Increased of the microenterprise and job employment in the respective communities;
    v.         Improvement of the quality of community services in the vocational training channels offered to youth- at- risk people
  vi.         Harmonization of relationships and restoration of trust between the community and the police;
vii.         High level reintegration success of ex-combatants into civilian and community life;
viii.         Reduction in the number of unoccupied and violent youth in target communities;
  ix.         Decrease in the number of repeat offenders released;
    x.         Decrease in the number of cases of victims of expeditionary justice and popular revenge;
  xi.         Reduced drug and alcohol abuse among youth;
xii.         Decrease in the number of cases of detainee’s abusive and prolonged preventive detention.
xiii.         Reduction in the number of street children and/or street children from the program's target areas;
xiv.         Decrease in the number of children living on the streets or roaming in the streets, from the target areas of the program;
 
  XII.            To Conclude
 
To conclude we want to highlight our understanding of the CVR and/or DDR second generation effectiveness realization.
 
In a CVR strategy we must avoid what we are calling "sword projects in water". As  example, why have infrastructure project in a community if this infrastructure is not a tool for decrease the factors causing violence and its can contribute to the restructuring of a system ensuring either the restructuring of community weakness to prevent and mitigate community violence dynamic. A CVR project is not implemented to claim to have performed a program. Because, each CVR strategy actions must be a pawn in the toolkit of the strategy to act on the community conflict. A CVR strategy is therefore an active hand conceived from the bottom to top and from top to bottom
 
It’s true the concept of “Community Violence Reduction (CVR)” has two aspects:  quantitative and qualitative. But, the first one is dependent to last one, its effectiveness realization, especially in the perspective of the durability of such a program effect. We could not ensure that CVR has successfully archived with only quantitative data. We need to specifically qualitative assessment of the achievement to ensure that the community resilience to fight against Violence thread is outcome by the programme.
 
DDR Second generation program is an implementation of Security Council mandates addressing the root causes of conflict and strengthening of national capacities by focusing on the inclusion of communities actors in peace reaching, building and it sustainment. As outlined above, DDR Second generation cannot achieve planned goals and sustainable if the program has not set-up in proper condition and with inclusion of key actors. DDR Second generation strategy, whereby all intervention dependencies have been identified in concentration actors and beneficiaries in pursuit of a common goal and shared objectives.
 
SECOND GENERATION OF DDR as composite of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) components into the DDR is not an end in itself. It is only an additional tool to support the stabilization process. It adapts to the context of its target communities. As a result, there is no one-way SECOND GENERATION OF DDR strategy. However, there is a SECOND GENERATION OF DDR approach that implies the use of appropriate community mechanisms to achieve community stabilization.
 
SECOND GENERATION OF DDR strategy need to be manage by legitimate authorities and/or states institutions. As new concept in the Peacekeeping operation, SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  strategy need to paid attention to lesson learn and build it knowledge to serve DPKO mission and host country. It is necessary to paid attention to lessons learnt, imagine new way, and develop new knowledge to address violence into communities because: Aggregate reductions can also mask the variability in violence among and within communities.
 
Finally let us highlight that SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  are not in comparison to the formal DDR program and security institutions issues and long-term development perspective :
 
  i.       SECOND GENERATION OF DDR program is not palliative as package for ensure the complete reintegration of ex-combatants. If SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  consider the Ex-combatant as a beneficiaries it is only reach it integration into the community reliable and effectiveness. In some cases, as sometimes the reinsertion package come later after the demobilization phase the combatants, a SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  program  phase the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  is a preventing action to avoid the recycling of ex-combatants into armed groups. SECOND GENERATION OF DDR  is certainly a support program to their reinsertion & reintegration, but it’s focused on the needs of communities to develop resilience to fight community violence and prevent it resurgence after the community stabilization;
 
ii.       The type of violence targeted by a SECOND GENERATION OF DDR program is not limited to the armed violence. That is why in UNSC resolution 1706 for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) mandate called to address in its Community Violence Reduction Programme the “Violence de voisinage”, (neighborhood violence);
 
iii.       SECOND GENERATION OF DDR is   not a development program. But SECOND GENERATION OF DDR interventions are a strong contribution to the post-conflict reconstruction activities. Its need to be implemented as pre-setting of development. In this regards, it necessary to get the involvement of UN agencies and international and National NGO’s. Who must during and at the end of the stabilization bring development projects to the communities. From this point of view, the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR Program is a client of the development actors, that is to say, SECOND GENERATION OF DDR works on their own account.
 
iv.       The aspect of community rapprochement to the security institutions as National Police (NP) institution don’t seem SECOND GENERATION OF DDR is targeted SSR objective. But it clear that in this approach SECOND GENERATION OF DDR intervention needs to be an osmosis view with the UN-SSR program supporting the host country to reform its security institutions. The focus of SECOND GENERATION OF DDR program differs from that of a SSR program.  While focuses on the security institutions SECOND GENERATION OF DDR focuses its attention on the community relationship with the police institution.
 
v.       Child soldiers, its clear DDR program don’t targeting directly young people aged less than 18 years. SECOND GENERATION OF DDR is not also a palliative to target these young-at-risk without the involvement of child protection and UNICEF. Keeping with the logic of protecting the superior interests of children associated with armed groups, the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR projects addressing the problems of these children as victims of armed conflicts resort to the expertise of qualified partners in close coordination with Child Protection and UNICEF.
 
vi.       As requested the Security Council resolution 1325[15], the gender perspective is strongly considered in the implementation of SECOND GENERATION OF DDR programme in the aim to set a clear and practical agenda for support together the advancement of women and community conflict resolution. SECOND GENERATION OF DDR planners need to work closely with female representatives and women’s groups in the formulation and implementation of the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR processes. SECOND GENERATION OF DDR activities need to carry out the women’s visibility and the recognition of their importance for the sustainability of the peace in the community, support them on the achievement of their post-conflict reconstruction activities in an environment free from threat, especially of sexualized violence. But, the SECOND GENERATION OF DDR program is not a gender policy.
 
vii.    A DDR Second generation program is not a spied tools and/or platform to reach intelligence information. That is important for the credibility of the program and the confident of actors to synergize communities’ actor’s efforts and convert all communities groups in one way to revitalize communities’ resilience factors against violence.
 
It accurate, neither the traditional DDR, neither the Second generation of DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence. But the traditional DDR will continue to perform in UN peacekeeping mission to help the establishment of a secure environment in post-conflict context, so that other elements of a peace-building strategy, including weapons management, security sector reform (SSR), elections and rule of law reform, can proceed. Finally the DDR second generation need to be considered as a complementary of the traditional DDR.
 
XIII.            Relevant Sources
 
1.      OPERATIONAL GUIDE TO THE INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION  STANDARDS, http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf, UN 2014;
2.      Kofi A. Annan, United Nations Secretary-General (Endorsed by) INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS, December 2006; http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%20Foreword%20and%20Acknowledgements.pdf. http://cpwg.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/08/UN-2006-IDDRS.pdf
3.      United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (Report commissioned by), SECOND GENERATION DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PRACTICES IN PEACE OPERATIONS, A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf,  United Nations 2010, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 380, Madison Ave, 11th Floor New York, NY 10017, USA.
4.      United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resources Center http://www.unddr.org/what-is-ddr/introduction_1.aspx;
5.      United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support: “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines”, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf, 2008.
6.      Re-orienting DDR to DDR Second generation (SECOND GENERATION OF DDR) in Haiti http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/MINUSTAH_SECOND GENERATION OF DDR _strategy.pdf, September 2007.
7.      Office des Nations Unies contre la Drogue et le Crime, MESURES CARCÉRALES ET MESURES NON PRIVATIVES DE LIBERTÉ: Réinsertion sociale, (Compilation d'outils d'évaluation de la justice pénale) https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/cjat/Reinsertion_sociale.pdf.
8.      L’accompagnement social des condamnés et des sortants de prison, http://conference-consensus.justice.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/fiche-15-accompagnement-social-sortants-prison.pdf, New York, 2008.
9.      Françoise Nduwimana (Prepared by) /Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), on Women, Peace and Security, Understanding the Implications, Fulfilling the Obligations,  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/cdrom/documents/Background_Paper_Africa.pdf
 



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Copyright © 2017, Jean Laforest Visene de Lyvia Tulce  ***Maya, Maya, Maya, Alaba***
Motto : Toujou chèche pou ou an amoni avèk Lanati -  Pwoteje tout moun ak ak tou sa ki egziste nan Lanati -  Pa gaspiye -  Pa detwi  -  Pa fè ogèy - Fè pou moun sa w ta renmen yo fè pou ou  -  Do No Harm & Full Responsibility Profession : Sociologue, Jurist & M.A Ex-sc. in Development, International certification in DDR - SSR - Humanitarian Coordination OCCUPATIONS : International consultant in Peace Building & Development. - Prof & Lecturer at Haitian State University (UEH)  Contact: Permanent adress : 20, Vilou, route intercommunale Maniche – Camp-Perrin, Les Cayes, Haiti, W.I -  Tel : +50943093449 ; +50949449085 (Haiti)  - +243 976513887 (RDC Congo) -  Email: visenejl@gmail.com; jealavise@yahoo.fr; visene@un.org - Skype : jeanlaforestvisene -  Social network : +50943093449 -  WebPage :  www.visenejl.blogspot.com;  http://www.jeanlaforestvisene.org




 



[1] Re-orienting DDR to Community Violence Reduction (CVR) in Haiti, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/MINUSTAH_CVR_strategy.pdf, 2007.
[2] UN Multidimensionnel Intégrâtes Stabilisation Mission in the Central Africain Republic,  Le programme de réduction de violence communautaire entre dans sa phase active, http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/le-programme-de-r-duction-de-violence-communautaire-entre-dans-sa,  01 February 2017.
[3] Southern Sudan and DDR: Adopting an Integrated Approach to Stabilization,   http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/HSBA-Sudan-conference-papers.pdf,  Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development, Studies, Geneva 2009
[4] Yvan Conoir (2007), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention and Management in Peacekeeping Operations http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/ddr/ddr_english.pdf, page 11. 
[6] Please, see United Nations (2010) “SECOND GENERATION DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) PRACTICES”, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf, page 14.
[7] Jean Laforest Visene de Lyvia Tulcé  (by), «HAÏTI  DES BRIGADES DE VIGILANCE (GROUPES D’AUTO-DEFENSE) ET PARAMILITAIRES A L’EMERGENCE ET LA RECUPERATION POLITIQUE DES GANGS ET BANDES ARMES DANS LES COMMUNAUTES »  https://visenejl.blogspot.com/2014/07/haiti-des-brigades-de-vigilance-groupes.html, juillet 2014
[8] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support: “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines”, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf, 2008, page 19.
 
[9] Jean Laforest Visene de Lyvia Tulcé (by), Linkage of the Community Reduction Violence approach in Haiti, http://visenejl.blogspot.com/2014/03/linked-of-community-reduction-violence.html, 30 mars 2014.
[10] Please see United Nations (2010) OP. Cit. page 24 t0 28.
[11] Please see UNDOC, 2008, page 18 (as below describe in relevant sources).
[12] Please see United Nations (2010) OP. Cit. page 18 to 19.
[13] DPA, DPI, DPKO, ILO, IOM, ODA, ODA, OHCHR, OSAA, OSRSG CAAC, PBSO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDIR, UNITAR, UN WOMEN, WFP, WHO, World Bank.
[14] Jean Laforest VISENE de Lyvia Tulce (by),  Choisir des bénéficiaires des programmes D‘apaisement social visant la résolution des problèmes de Violence : Proposition d’un modèle de sélection,  http://visenejl.blogspot.com/2014/08/choisir-des-beneficiaires-des.html,  lundi 11 août 2014.
[15] Françoise Nduwimana (Prepared by) /Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), on Women, Peace and Security, Understanding the Implications, Fulfilling the Obligations,